Ethnic and Religious Violence in Indonesia

Outbursts of violence (whether it is labeled religious, ethnic, state or communal violence) have a long history in Indonesia. It can be argued that (the danger of) state violence - committed by the Indonesian army - is what succeeded in curtailing other forms of violence during Suharto's New Order. Ethnic and religious violence flared up when the New Order showed signs of weaknesses around the time that Suharto stepped down from office in 1998. The early Reformation period was a period of many uncertainties for Indonesians. Political power was decentralized to the regions which meant that struggles for local power emerged. The Asian Financial Crisis
had caused poverty, unemployment and uncertainty about the future in many households. Ethnic and religious sentiments, previously suppressed by Suharto's 'SARA-policy' (meaning a ban on the public discussion on the topic of ethnic group, religion, race and group-based interest as these might endanger public order), flared up.

Ethnic violence has more or less seized to be since 2002 after regional violence in Jakarta, Medan (Sumatra), Kalimantan, Poso (Sulawesi) and the Moluccas caused many casualties between the years 1996 and 2002. It is, however, not correct to mark the above cases as 'ethnic violence' only. Violence purely because of ethnic differences seems highly unlikely as in each case other aspects play an influential role. For example, violence against the Chinese Indonesians, which emerged around the time of Suharto's resignation, has a lot to do with the country's economic circumstances. The Chinese Indonesians had always been resented because they own a relative big portion of Indonesia's business cake, despite forming just a tiny minority in Indonesia's population (and in fact rich Chinese Indonesians are only a small proportion of the total number of Chinese Indonesians in Indonesia). In times of political and economic turmoil it is not hard to instigate anti-Chinese feelings that results in violence.

The regional violence that has happened in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and the Moluccas between 1996 and 2002 are more likely examples of local power struggles within a power vacuum around the fall of Suharto. Religious and ethnic sentiments were incited by certain sides that thought could benefit their position.

Religious intolerance in Indonesia (sometimes culminating in violence) is on the rise. The Setara Institute, an Indonesian research and advocacy group, counted 216 cases of violent attacks on religious minorities in 2010, 244 cases in 2011 and 264 cases in 2012. Target of these attacks are often Christians and their churches or followers of the Ahmadiyah (a stream within Islam) and their places of worship. Usually it involves the demolition of holy places, sometimes the beating up of people, but rarely does it involve the killing of people. Perpetrators behind these attacks are usually members of radical Muslim groups such as Front Pembela Islam. The most recent horrific act of ethnic violence was the slaughtering of three Ahmadis by a mob of hundreds of people in February 2011 in Cikeusik, West Java. It received much international attention and human right watchers have stressed the Indonesian government to respect religious freedom and to protect its people. The reaction of Indonesia's government towards this rising religious intolerance has been weak. After the Ahmadiyah slaughtering, there was a slow reaction of condemnation by the government which caused much criticism, especially from within Indonesia. More criticism followed as the killers of the Ahmadis were given short prison sentences by the Indonesian court, even though the killers were clearly filmed while killing the victims. Although most Indonesians are highly supportive of a religious pluralist society, Indonesians tend to be very apathetic towards these forms of violence, as if it is better not to make a fuzz about it, but instead forget that it ever happened.

source : indonesia-investments.com